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Abstract 
 
The primary objective of this paper is to identify the factors that explain Brazilian companies‟ level of voluntary 
disclosure. Underpinning this work is the Discretionary-based Disclosure theory. The sample is composed of the 
top 100 largest non-financial companies listed in the Bolsa de Valores de São Paulo (Brazilian Securities, 
Commodities, and Futures exchange - BOVESPA). Information was gathered from Financial Statements for the 
years ending in 2006, 2007, and 2008, with the use of content analysis. A disclosure framework based on 27 
studies from these years was created, with a total of 92 voluntary items divided into two dimensions: economic 
(43) and socio-environmental (49). Based on the existing literature, a total of 12 hypotheses were elaborated and 
tested using a panel data approach. Results evidence that: (a) Sector and Origin of Control are statistically 
significant in all three models tested: economic, socio-environmental, and total; (b) „Profitability‟ is relevant in 
the economic model and in the total model; (c) Tobin‟s Q is relevant in the socio-environmental model and in the 
total disclosure model; (d) Leverage and Auditing Firm are only relevant in the economic disclosure model; (e) 
Size, Governance, Stock Issuing, Growth Opportunities and Concentration of Control are not statistically 
significant in any of the three models. 
 
Key words: discretionary disclosure; determinants; Brazil. 
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Introduction 
 
 
Voluntary disclosure is any disclosure that exceeds what is recommended by law and represents 
a freely made decision by managers to disclose additional information (Meek, Roberts, & Gray, 1995). 
In this sense, voluntary disclose is a choice, just like other accounting choices regarding recognition 
and measurement of economic transactions (for instance FIFO or LIFO for inventory). But why would 
managers and/or companies choose to disclose more information than required by law? 
Recent studies have showed that companies enjoy several benefits with increased disclosure, for 
instance: lower cost of equity capital (Alencar, 2007; Botosan, 1997; Hail, 2002), lower cost of debt 
(Lima, 2007; Sengupta, 1998), greater market liquidity (Leuz & Verrecchia, 2000; Welker, 1995) and 
more analyst following (Healy, Hunton, & Palepu, 1999; Lang & Lundholm, 2000).  
However, if companies do not disclose all the information they have, i.e. they are not fully 
transparent, one should presume that there are costs involved with voluntary disclosure, for example 
costs related to personnel and certification (Leuz & Wysocki, 2008) and property costs, both in 
regards to the disclosure of information that is strategic to the company (Verrecchia, 2001).  
In this scenario, managers possess different kinds of information of which disclosure is not 
mandatory and they exercise discretion with regard to the information about which they have 
knowledge (Verrecchia, 2001). The rationale is that costs and benefits influence the choice of 
engaging in voluntary disclosure. 
In this environment, characterized by costs and benefits, Discretionary-based Disclosure 
(Verrecchia, 2001) provides the conceptual and theoretical framework which can be used to examine 
the incentives that motivate voluntary disclosure. This theory evaluates under which circumstances 
companies will choose to disclose certain kinds of information. Therefore, voluntary disclosure can be 
explained by corporate characteristics such as size, profitability, leverage etc. (Cunha & Ribeiro, 
2006).  
Prior works on the determinants of voluntary disclosure have been conducted in several 
countries: France (Depoers, 2000); Hong Kong (Wallace & Naser, 1995), Japan (Cooke, 1992), 
Malaysia (Hossain, Tan, & Adams, 1994), the Czech Republic (Patton & Zelenka, 1997), Sweden 
(Cooke, 1989) and Switzerland (Raffounier, 1995).  
In that same line of thinking, the objective of this paper is to identify the factors that explain the 
level of voluntary disclosure of Brazilian listed companies.  
The main justifications for conducting this research are: (a) Brazil is a BRIC, the largest 
economy in South America and one of the largest economies in the World and (b) the Brazilian 
Market is characterized by low enforcement, incentives for manipulation of financial statements due to 
tax influence, an unstable financial market and poor governance standards (Lopes & Walker, 2008) 
where a great variability of disclosure level is expected. For these reasons, Brazil represents a unique 
scenario for an empirical test of the determinants of voluntary disclosure. 
At the same time, this paper extends the existing literature in two different manners. First, most 
of the prior studies have analyzed only one dimension of disclosure (for instance only socio-
environmental information). On the other hand, this paper uses a disclosure index based on 27 prior 
studies and composed of 92 kinds of information that take into consideration social, environmental, 
and economic dimensions. This is important because factors (profitability, for example) that explain 
certain dimensions of disclosure might not explain others. This paper takes this fact into consideration 
and tests for the different dimensions of disclosure separately.  
Also, most prior studies have analyzed corporate disclosure in only one period, using a cross 
sectional approach. This might be a problem because some variables (size, for example) may be 
Discretionary-Based Disclosure      91 
BAR, Rio de Janeiro, v. 9, n. 1, art. 5, p. 88-109, Jan./Mar. 2012 www.anpad.org.br/bar  
significant when we compare different companies in one period (larger companies disclose more 
information than smaller companies, for instance), but insignificant when we compare the company to 
itself along the years (a company has grown, but disclosure has remained constant). For that reason, 
we analyzed corporate disclosure during three years with a panel data approach which takes both cross 
sectional and longitudinal aspects into consideration.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follow: the next section presents this study‟s 
hypotheses and reviews Discretionary-based Disclosure; following the methodological aspects are 
described; after that, the study´s results; the last section presents this paper‟s conclusions. 
 
 
Hypotheses Development   
 
 
The theory underpinning this study is that of Discretionary-based Disclosure, which treats 
disclosure endogenously, by considering managers‟ incentive to disclose certain kinds of information. 
According to Dye (2001) this is a special case of Game Theory, where the central premise is that 
entities will always evaluate the information to be disclosed as a function of costs and benefits. 
The rationale is that the benefits of voluntary disclosure should be higher than its costs (Dye, 
2001). Basically, if the managers‟ objective is to maximize shareholders‟ wealth, there seems to be 
selective disclosure; where information that favors an entity is disclosed, while any that harms it is not 
(Verrecchia, 2001).  
Given Game Theory analysis, it can be expected that much of the voluntary disclosure is 
beneficial to the entity (Dye, 2001). However, due to the risk of adverse selection derived from 
information asymmetry, entities may also disclose negative information whenever they believe there 
will be a higher penalty for the absence of certain information. This is because there are costs of being 
evaluated by the market as a lemon (Akerlof, 1970).   
According to Dobler (2005), Discretionary-based Disclosure analyzes the conditions in which 
information is voluntary disclosed by companies due to its strategic interaction with external agents 
(investors, competitors etc.). In this sense, this theory helps to identify in which circumstances 
managers and/or companies choose to disclose (or not to disclose) information. Hence, voluntary 
disclosure could be explained by characteristics related to the company.  
In this paper, 12 factors have been extracted from existing literature in order to explain the level 
of voluntary disclosure of Brazilian companies. Figure 1 illustrates the research design.  
 
 
Figure 1. Research Design - Determinants of Voluntary Disclosure. 
Voluntary
Disclosure
Auditing Firm Size 
Profitability 
Financial Leverage 
Corporate Governance
Internationalization
Industry
Growth Opportunity
Tobin´s Q
Stock Issuing
Concentration of Control
Origin of Control
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The 12 factors presented in Exhibit 1 are this study‟s hypotheses: (a) auditing firm; (b) 
profitability; (c) Tobin‟s Q; (d) internationalization; (e) size; (f) corporate governance; (g) financial 
leverage; (h) concentration of control; (i) stock issuing; (j) growth opportunity; (k) sector and (l) origin 
of control. A brief discussion of these hypotheses are presented below.   
H1: Companies audited by „Big Four‟ firms tend to disclose more information than companies 
audited by „other auditing firms‟. 
Watts and Zimmerman (1986) argue that auditors incur costs when entering into contracts with 
clients. In this sense, auditors tend to influence companies to disclose as much information is possible 
in order to reduce possible litigation costs due to an absence of information. The fraud scandal 
involving auditing company Arthur Andersen and its client, Enron Corporation, illustrates the fact 
that, in some cases, auditors might be considered liable for their clients‟ practices. In this sense, we 
expect companies audited by KPMG, PricewaterhouseCoopers, Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu and 
Ernst&Young to disclose more information than companies audited by other auditing firms. 
H2: Companies with higher levels of profitability tend to disclose more information than 
companies with lower levels of profitability. 
H3: Companies with better performance in the financial market tend to disclose more 
information than companies with worse performance in the financial market. 
Without information investors cannot differentiate good companies from bad companies 
(lemons). Therefore, due to information asymmetry they tend to offer a price (average price between 
good and bad companies) that is not attractive to good companies. This argument is based on the 
problem of adverse selection derived from information asymmetry, which was first presented by 
Akerlof (1970). 
In this scenario, disclosure reduces information asymmetry and serves as a signal of the 
company‟s quality. This is known as Signaling Theory. Therefore, well-run companies have incentives 
to distinguish themselves from less profitable companies in order to raise capital on the best available 
terms. Thus, we expect more profitable firms and firms with better performance in the financial 
market to disclose more information in order to differentiate themselves from lemons.  
H4: Companies listed in the New York Stock Market (NYSE) tend to disclose more 
information than companies listed only in Bolsa de Valores de São Paulo (BOVESPA). 
According to Archambault and Archambault (2003), disclosure practice tends to be influenced 
by the stock market in which the company operates. Also, companies listed in international financial 
markets have more pressure to disclose information when compared to companies that negotiate only 
in the local market (Meek et al., 1995). 
Specifically in the United States, the requirements for disclosing information are much more 
demanding than in Brazil. Also, the enforcement of these requirements by the Securities Exchange 
Commission (SEC) is much stricter than the enforcement exercised by the Brazilian Exchange 
Commission. Both of these factors should lead to greater transparency. Thus, we expect Brazilian 
companies listed in the New York Stock Market (NYSE) to disclose more information in the Brazilian 
Market as well.  
H5: Larger companies tend to disclose more information than smaller companies. 
The development of this hypothesis is based on the Political Cost Hypothesis of Positive 
Accounting Theory (Watts & Zimmerman, 1986). Basically, larger firms have higher political costs 
due to their visibility which might lead to higher scrutiny from both government and society. 
According to Hackston and Milne (1996), both Agency Theory and Legitimacy Theory also contain 
arguments for a size-disclosure relationship. In addition, Firth (1979) suggests that companies with 
higher visibility tend to disclose more information in order to improve corporate image.  
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H6: Companies with better corporate governance practices tend to disclose more information 
than companies with worse corporate governance practices.  
According to the Bonding Hypothesis, companies from countries with weak institutions, 
characterized by low investor protection, might engage in additional governance mechanisms in order 
to gain investors‟ confidence (Leuz, 2006). Specifically in Brazil, companies might list their stocks in 
the Corporate Governance Levels of Bovespa.  
We expected companies with better corporate governance practices to have better disclosure 
practices as well. This is because corporate disclosure can be considered one dimension of corporate 
governance due to the fact that its monitoring function can reduce the risk of expropriation by 
managers.  
H7: Companies with higher levels of financial leverage tend to disclose more information than 
companies with lower levels of financial leverage.  
Due to manager‟s natural tendency to assume higher risks, creditors might impose restrictions 
on a company‟s operation, such as with debt covenants. This is due to risk that the money borrowed by 
the company might be transferred to shareholders. According to Depoers (2000), the larger the 
proportion of debt in the company‟s capital structure, the higher the agency costs, and consequently 
more possibilities of wealth transfer from creditors to investors. In this sense, Agency Theory states 
that firms with higher levels of financial leverage tend to voluntary disclose more information in order 
to satisfy creditors and remove the suspicions of wealth transfer to shareholders (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976).  
H8: Companies that have less concentrated ownership tend to disclose more information than 
companies with more concentrated ownership. 
The more dispersed the firm‟s ownership is, the greater the separation between property and 
control, which generates larger agency conflicts between insiders and outsiders (Depoers, 2000), and 
consequently has a direct influence on the level of disclosure (Chow & Wong-Boren, 1987). The 
premise is that investors who have a significant portion of company‟s stocks can obtain information 
privately (Archambault & Archambault, 2003), because they are generally part of the management or 
the Board, and thus have insider information. In this sense, we expect companies with more disperse 
ownership to disclose more information.  
H9: Companies that issued stock in 2007, 2008 and 2009 tend to disclose more information 
than companies that did not issue stock in that period.  
According to Baums (2002), companies would be willing to disclose information when raising 
capital even if they were not required to do so. In this sense, even if disclosure wasn´t mandatory, 
companies would still disclose information. That happens because companies that are able to reduce 
information asymmetry during the time they are issuing stock should be able to enjoy lower levels of 
the cost of capital (Lang & Lundholm, 2000). 
In this sense, we expect companies that underwent a stock issuance during the years of 2007, 
2008 and 2009 (i.e., ex post, the year following the disclosure) to voluntary disclosure more 
information in order to reduce the information asymmetry component of cost of capital. 
H10: Companies with greater growth opportunities tend to disclose more information than 
companies with lower growth opportunities. 
Companies that have greater opportunities to grow are likely to need resources in the near 
future. In this sense, these companies tend to adopt better corporate governance mechanisms, for 
instance better disclosure practices (Khancel, 2007). More transparency results in better investor 
protection due to enhanced monitoring and better decision making. Consequently investors would be 
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more willing to finance companies. Therefore, we expect companies that have greater growth 
opportunities to disclose more information.  
H11: Companies from the electric energy sector tend to disclose more information than 
companies from other sectors. 
Some sectors are more regulated than others. Regulation, in theory, should increase disclosure, 
as good laws are the ones that can be enforced. That is true, especially, in a developing country like 
Brazil, where empirical evidence has shown that companies don´t follow the disclosure requirement of 
international accounting standards (see for instance Murcia & Santos, 2009, on financial instruments 
disclosure). 
Specifically in the electric energy sector, regulation and enforcement from Agência Nacional de 
Energia Elétrica (ANEEL) has largely influenced the disclosure habits of companies. For instance, 
although is not mandatory, most companies from this sector do disclose their Social Balance. Also, 
specifically regarding social information, descriptive analysis has shown that eight out of the ten 
companies with the highest levels of social disclosure are from the electric energy sector. For these 
reasons, we expect companies from the electric energy sector to disclose, on average, more 
information than companies from other sectors.  
H12: Companies controlled by the State tend to disclose more information than companies with 
private control.  
The justification to why a company controlled by the state should disclose higher levels of 
information is not clear, as studies on the determinants of disclosure have not tested this hypothesis. 
Hence, there is not a descriptive theory that justifies this hypothesis.  
However, descriptive analysis of data has shown that origin of control might be a significant 
variable in explaining a company‟s voluntary disclosure level. For instance, descriptive analysis has 
shown that five out of the ten companies with highest levels of disclosure are controlled by the State 
(Petrobras, Sabesp, Sanepar, Cesp and Eletrobrás). For this reason, the effect of origin of control is 
taken into consideration and therefore we expect companies controlled by the State to disclose more 
information.  
 
 
Methods  
 
 
The presentation of this study‟s methods is divided into three parts: (a) analysis of corporate 
voluntary disclosure, (b) description of the study‟s sample and (c) the panel data model. 
 
Analysis of corporate voluntary disclosure 
 
Content analysis was utilized in order to collect information and analyze corporate disclosure, 
According to Krippendorf (1990), this technique enables the study of messages in a rigorous and 
systematic manner. Also, content analysis permits a researcher to classify qualitative information into 
categories (Abbott & Monsen, 1979), which facilitates the inference process of messages (Bardin, 
1977).  
A very important decision regarding content analysis regards which document to analyze. In 
this study, financial statements, for the years ending in 2006, 2007, and 2008, and available on 
Bovespa‟s website were selected for analysis. In this sense, the documents analyzed in this study were 
the Demonstração Financeira Padronizada (DFPs), which are the official versions of a company‟s 
financial statement in Brazil.  
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In order to analyze voluntary corporate disclosure, an index was elaborated. This index is based 
on 27 prior studies regarding corporate disclosure: Ernst & Ernst (1978); Chow and Wong Boren 
(1987); Zeghal and Ahmed (1990); Meek, Roberts and Gray (1995); Gray, Kouhy and Lavers (1995); 
Hackston and Milne (1996); Burrit and Welch (1997); Botosan (1997); Williams (1999); Depoers 
(2000); Salomone and Galluccio (2001); Deegan, Rankin and Tobin (2002); Hail (2002); Nossa 
(2002); Standard & Poor's (2002); Kuasirikun and Sherer (2004); Lanzana (2004); Yusoff, Lehman 
and Nasir (2006); Malacrida and Yamamoto (2006); Lima (2007); Alencar (2007); Iudícibus, Martins 
and Gelbcke (2007); Andrade and Salotti (2008); Francis, Nanda and Olsson (2008); Hossain (2008), 
Morris and Tronnes (2008) and Orens and Lybaert (2008). 
This index contains only information that is not mandatory for Brazilian listed companies. It has 
a total of 92 types of information and is divided into two dimensions: socio-environmental (49) and 
economic (34). The socio-environmental dimension has 11 categories and 49 subcategories: social 
financial information (4), products and services (2), employees (9), environmental policies (5), 
environmental management and auditing (3), impact of products and services on the environment (7), 
energy (3), environmental financial information (6), environmental education and research (2), carbon 
credits (4) and other environmental information (4). 
 
Table 1 
 
Disclosure Index – Social-Environmental Dimension 
 
SOCIAL DISCLOSURE 
Social Financial Information 
Value added statement 
Mentions of the value added or distributed 
Social investments 
Expenditures on social projects  
Products and Services 
Statement about the adequacy of safety regulations  
Complaints about the company‟s products and services  
Employees 
Number of employees 
Employee salary 
Employee benefits 
Employee satisfaction  
Minorities in the workforce 
Education and training 
Safety in the workplace 
Accidents in the workplace  
Relationship with labor unions 
ENVIRONMENTAL DISCLOSURE 
Environmental Policies 
Actual environmental policies 
Environmental goals, targets and objectives 
Compliance with licenses, laws and environmental entities 
Environmental partnerships 
Environmental prizes and participation and sustainability indexes   
Continues 
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Table 1 (continued) 
 
ENVIRONMENTAL DISCLOSURE 
Environmental Management and 
Auditing 
Environmental management 
ISO 14.000 
Environmental auditing 
Impact of Products and Services in the 
Environment 
Waste  
Packaging  
Recycling  
Development of ecological products 
Efficient use of water 
Impacts on the environment 
Repair of environmental damages 
Energy 
Energy conservation / energy efficiency in business operations   
Use of waste material for energy production 
Development of new sources of energy 
Environmental Financial Information 
Environmental investments  
Environmental costs and expenses 
Environmental liabilities 
Description of accounting practices for environmental issues 
Environmental insurance 
Environmental assets 
Environmental Education and 
Research 
Environmental education 
Environmental research 
Carbon Credits 
Clean development mechanisms (CDM) 
Carbon credits 
Emission of greenhouse gases 
Certified emission reductions (CERs) 
Other Environmental Information 
Any mention concerning sustainability 
Forest management 
Biodiversity conservation 
Stakeholders 
 
The economic dimension of the disclosure index has 6 categories and 34 subcategories: business 
environment (8), operating activity (8), strategic information (8), financial information (7), financial 
ratios (4) and corporate governance (8).  
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Table 2  
 
Disclosure Index – Economic Dimension 
 
ECONOMIC DISCLOSURE 
Business Environment 
Impact of economic events on the company  
Discussion of sector (industry) 
Discussion of competitors 
Relationship with suppliers 
Customer satisfaction 
Market share 
Identification of key business risks 
Foreign exchange rate exposure 
Operating Activity 
Company‟s history 
Organizational structure 
Technological aspects of operations 
Segment information 
Use of operating capacity 
Efficiency indicators 
Units produced or services rendered 
Units sold 
Strategic Information 
Company‟s goals and objectives 
Future capital expenditures 
Main business markets 
New markets to enter 
Politics for reinvesting earnings 
Research and development 
Quality of products and services 
Price of products and services 
Financial Information 
Price level accounting 
Information in US GAAP or IFRS 
Detailed information on company‟s costs and expenses 
Stock price or appreciation  
Market capitalization 
Projections (cash flow, earnings, revenues, etc.) 
Cash flow statement 
Financial Ratios 
Profitability ratios  
Liquidity ratios 
Financial leverage ratios 
EBITDA 
Continues 
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Table 2 (Continued) 
 
ECONOMIC DISCLOSURE 
Corporate Governance 
Main corporate governance practices 
Members of fiscal board 
Members of board of administration 
Key managers 
Managers‟ compensation 
Auditors‟ compensation 
Main shareholders 
Relationship with investors 
 
It is worthwhile to mention that the disclosure index has been adjusted for the fiscal year ending 
in 2008 due to the enactment of Law 11.638/07 that required Brazilian companies to disclose the Cash 
Flow Statement and Value Added Statement starting from the year 2008. Hence, both of these 
statements were only considered in the years ending in 2006 and 2007, as the objective of the 
disclosure index was to evaluate only voluntary information.    
Based on the framework presented in Exhibits 2 and 3, three disclosure indexes were computed 
for each company: (a) socio-environmental disclosure, (b) economic disclosure and (c) total disclosure 
(socio-environmental and economic). These disclosure indexes utilized a non-weighted approach (1 if 
the company disclosed the information and 0 otherwise). In this sense, a company‟s disclosure score is 
computed by dividing the number of subcategories disclosed by the total number of categories.  
For instance, Petrobras, from the Oil and Gas sector, for the year ending in 2006, received: (a) 
an economic disclosure score of 81,40% (35/43), (b) a socio-environmental disclosure score of 
73.47% (36/49) and (c) a total disclosure score of 77,17% (71/92). Based on these criteria, three 
disclosure indexes were assigned to each company in each one of the three years.  
In order to check the internal validity of the disclosure index, the Crombach‟s Alpha test was 
conducted. The results were: 0,9010 or 90,10% in 2006, 0,9113 or 91,13% in 2007 and 0,8960 or 
89,60% in 2008. Scores around 90% are considered very good. In this sense, the disclosure index 
developed in this study was considered appropriate to be used as a dependent variable in the models 
that wished to explain voluntary disclosure practices of Brazilian companies.  
 
Study’s sample 
 
The sample was composed of the largest companies listed in the Bolsa de Valores de São Paulo 
(Bovespa). The top one hundred companies based on gross revenues of 2007 were selected, excluding 
the financial industry due to their specificities. However, 2 financial statements in 2006 and 8 financial 
statements in 2008 were not available due to delay, cancellation, etc. Hence, the final sample 
comprised: 98 companies in 2006, 100 companies in 2007 and 92 companies in 2008.  
In terms of market capitalization, companies in the sample represent approximately 55,07% 
(2006), 57,11% (2007) and 55,91% (2008) of total market capitalization of Bovespa. In this sense, 
although the sample was not selected randomly, it can be considered representative of Brazilian listed 
companies. 
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Panel data approach 
 
The reason for using a panel data approach in this paper derives from analyzing corporate 
voluntary disclosure during three years, as this statistical technique takes both cross sectional (100 
companies) and longitudinal (years ended in 2006, 2007 and 2008) aspects into consideration.  
In this paper, because voluntary disclosure was divided into two dimensions, three models for 
disclosure were tested for: (a) socio-environmental disclosure, (b) economic disclosure and (c) total 
disclosure (socio-environmental and economic). The disclosure index for each model is the dependent 
variable.  
 
Table 3 
 
Dependent Variables of the Panel Model 
 
Dependent 
Variables 
Symbol Proxies Developed 
Social and 
Environmenta
l Disclosure 
DIS_SOC_ENV Number of subcategories regarding social and environmental disclosure 
presented by the company (x) divided by the total number of 
subcategories in the index regarding social and environmental disclosure 
(49)  
Economic 
Disclosure 
DIS_ECO Number of subcategories regarding economic disclosure presented by 
the company (y) divided by the total number of subcategories in the 
index regarding economic disclosure (43) 
Total 
Disclosure 
DIS_TOTAL Total number of subcategories presented by the company (x+ y) divided 
by the total number of subcategories in the index (92) 
 
On the other hand, the independent variables are the 12 hypotheses being tested: (a) auditing 
firm; (b); profitability; (c) Tobin‟s Q (d); internationalization; (e) size; (f) corporate governance; (g) 
financial leverage; (h) concentration of control; (i) stock issuing; (j) growth opportunity; (k) sector 
(industry) and (l) origin of control. 
 
Table 4 illustrates the independent variables of this study. 
 
Table 4  
 
Independent Variables of Panel Model 
 
Independent 
Variables 
Symbol Expected 
Relation 
Proxies Used 
Size SIZE (+) Ln (Revenues) 
Sector SECTOR 
(+) 
Companies that belong to the electric sector =1 and  
companies from other sectors = 0 
Tobin‟s Q TOBIN (+) (Market Capitalization + Book Liabilities)/ Book Assets 
Origin of control ORIG_CONT
R 
(+) 
Companies controlled by the State  =1 and = 0 
otherwise 
Profitability PROFIT (+) Return on Equity (ROE) 
Financial leverage LEV (+) Total Liability divided by Total Assets 
Corporate 
governance 
GOV 
(+) 
Companies that belong to Level I, II and New Market of 
Bovespa =1 and = 0 otherwise 
Continues 
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Table 4 (Continued) 
 
Independent 
Variables 
Symbol Expected 
Relation 
Proxies Used 
Stock issuing ISSUE 
(+) 
Companies that  issued  stock during the years of 2007, 
2008 and 2009 = 1 and otherwise = 0 
Growth 
opportunity 
GROW 
(+) 
Revenue change from t e t-1.   
Concentration of 
control 
CONC_CON
T 
(+) 
Companies controlled by a single stockholder (50% + 1 
of ordinary shares) = 1 otherwise = 0. 
Auditing firm AUD 
(+) 
Companies audited by „Big Four‟ = 1 and companies 
audited by „other companies‟ = 0.  
Internationalization INTER (+) Companies with ADRs Levels II e III = 1 otherwise = 0. 
 
One important decision when using a panel data approach regards which type of panel model to 
use: pooling, fixed effects and random effects. For these, statistical tests have been conducted: Chow 
Test (pooling versus fixed effects), Breusch-Pagan (pooling versus random effects) and Hausman Test 
(random effects versus fixed effects). The results, which are presented in exhibit 6, showed the panel 
data with random effects is the most appropriate one for all three disclosure models of this study.  
 
Table 5 
 
Statistical Tests – Panel Data Model 
 
Tests 
Disclosure Dimensions 
Economic Socio -Environmental Total 
Chow Prob > F = 0.0000 Prob > F = 0.0000 Prob > F = 0.0000 
Breusch-Pagan Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
Hausman Prob> chi2 = 0.5549 Prob> chi2 = 0.9067 Prob> chi2 = 0.7311 
Panel data model to be 
used  
Random Effects Random Effects Random Effects 
 
 
Results 
 
 
This section presents the results of the panel data analysis with the objective to identify the 
factors that are relevant in explaining voluntary corporate disclosure in the Brazilian financial market. 
The results are presented for the three disclosure models: economic, socio-environmental and total 
(economic and socio-environmental). Initially, in order to identify possible indications of 
multicollinearity, a correlation matrix analysis has been conducted.  
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Table 6 
 
Correlation Matrix 
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AUD 1               
ORIG_CONT -0,17 1              
GOV 0,09 0,02 1             
SECTOR -0,12 0,10 -0,07 1            
CONC_CONT 0,12 -0,14 0,18 -0,26 1           
INTER 0,15 0,09 0,15 -0,18 0,07 1          
SIZE 0,07 0,22 0,10 -0,06 -0,01 0,56 1         
DIS_SOC-ENV 0,01 0,40 -0,05 0,45 -0,19 0,13 0,17 1        
DIS_TOTAL 0,06 0,39 0,01 0,36 -0,11 0,20 0,22 0,93 1       
DIS_ECO 0,12 0,27 0,10 0,15 0,03 0,26 0,25 0,59 0,85 1      
LEV -0,07 -0,16 -0,17 0,03 0,01 0,03 0,01 -0,15 -0,15 -0,10 1     
TOBIN 0,20 -0,24 0,21 -0,17 0,19 0,14 0,06 -0,01 -0,01 -0,01 -0,06 1    
GROW -0,02 -0,07 0,17 -0,28 0,08 0,04 0,04 -0,26 -0,23 -0,13 0,01 0,18 1   
PROFIT 0,21 -0,22 -0,01 -0,01 0,10 -0,01 0,04 -0,01 0,03 0,08 0,29 0,42 0,13 1  
ISSUE 0,01 -0,01 0,10 -0,07 0,02 -0,01 0,03 -0,07 -0,04 0,01 0,11 0,06 0,05 0,17 1 
 
It should be noted that the variables internationalization and size have a correlation coefficient 
of 0,56. This seems natural, as the proxy used for internationalization is issuance of ADRs Levels II 
and III in the NYSE. Therefore, as expected, Brazilian companies listed in the NYSE that issue these 
types of receipts are large corporations. Consequently, these two variables have a strong, positive 
correlation.  
This strong correlation indicates possible signals of multicollinearity, which was confirmed 
when both of these variables were included in the models. The inclusion of internationalization in the 
models caused the polarity of variable size to change, from positive to negative, contrary to that stated 
by the existing literature (Political Cost Hypothesis for instance), as larger companies tend to disclose, 
on average, more information. Therefore, internationalization was subsequently excluded from the 
analysis.  
The other independent variables did not present strong correlations with each other. On the 
other hand, as expected, dependent variables did present strong, positive correlations with each other. 
That seems natural, as companies who disclose more economic information tend to also disclose more 
social and environmental information. However, dependent variables are not perfectly correlated. In 
this sense, the research design of this paper is justified, i.e., the factors that explain socio-
environmental disclosure are not the same factors that explain economic disclosure. Hence, the 
disclosure dimensions need to be analyzed separately.  
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The results from the panel data analysis are presented as follows. First, the economic disclosure 
model is presented; second, the socio-environmental model; and last, the total disclosure model.  
 
Table 7 
 
Panel Data – Economic Disclosure (DIS_ECO) 
 
Variable 
Coefficient Std. Error t statistics Prob. 
SIZE 0.017837 0.030219 0.590281 0.5556 
SECTOR 0.066646 0.034381 1.938451 0.0539 
TOBIN 0.017161 0.014000 1.225793 0.2216 
ORIG_CONT 0.184635 0.054321 3.398985 0.0008 
PROFIT 0.014328 0.004901 2.923199 0.0038 
LEV 0.009981 0.003116 3.202771 0.0016 
GOV 0.013016 0.018880 0.689384 0.4913 
ISSUE -0.021212 0.013223 -1.604090 0.1102 
GROW -0.010865 0.007353 -1.477627 0.1410 
CONC_CONT 0.022475 0.021971 1.022945 0.3075 
AUD 0.019049 0.010513 1.811989 0.0714 
C 0.104374 0.428170 0.243767 0.8076 
R-square 0.111721 Adj. R-square 0.066485  
F Statistics 2.469717 Prob. (F) 0.006240  
Jarque-Bera 1.967629 Prob. (JB) 0.373882  
Durbin-Watson 2.370170    
Note. * White cross-section standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected). 
 
Regarding the panel data assumptions: (a) Jarque-Bera test did not reject the null hypothesis of 
normal distribution of errors; (b) Durbin-Watson statistics is 2,37, which is a little above of the 1,8-2,2 
range, indicating possible residual autocorrelation and; (c) heteroscedasticity has been detected and 
corrected by the White covariance matrix. 
The model is significant as a whole, according to the F statistics. Its explanatory power, 
measured by R-square and Adjusted R-square, is approximately 11,17% and 6,65% respectively. 
Sector, Origin of Control, Profitability and Leverage are statistically significant at a significance level 
of 5%. Auditing is also significant, but at a 10% significance level. Concerning the expected direction 
of the relations, Growth Opportunity was the only metric variable that presented a different polarity 
from what was expected.  
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Table 8  
 
Panel Data - Socio-Environmental Disclosure (DIS_SOC_ENV) 
 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t statistics Prob.   
SIZE 0.007813 0.034390 0.227200 0.8205 
SECTOR 0.167514 0.023718 7.062702 0.0000 
TOBIN 0.042033 0.006473 6.493868 0.0000 
PROFIT 0.011460 0.011627 0.985611 0.3254 
ORIG_CONT 0.321167 0.079839 4.022683 0.0001 
LEV 0.010847 0.018181 0.596587 0.5514 
GOV -0.028773 0.025448 -1.130675 0.2594 
ISSUE -0.023724 0.052385 -0.452871 0.6511 
GROW -0.016781 0.011154 -1.504431 0.1339 
CONC_CONT -0.017035 0.024169 -0.704828 0.4817 
AUD 0.014084 0.032129 0.438372 0.6616 
C 0.120091 0.464205 0.258704 0.7961 
R-square 0.280176 Adj. R-square 0.243518 
 
F Statistics  7.643016 Prob. (F) 0.000000 
 
Jarque-Bera  1.132726 Prob. (JB)  0.567586 
Durbin-Watson 2.078771    
Note. * White cross-section standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected). 
 
The socio-environmental disclosure model is also significant as a whole according to the F 
statistics and has an explanatory power of approximately 28,02% (R-square) and 24,35% (Adjusted R-
square). Concerning panel data assumptions, residuals: (a) are normally distributed according to the 
Jarque-Bera test; (b) not autocorrelated according to the Durbin-Watson test; and (c) do not present 
constant variance, which has been corrected by White covariance matrix. 
Only three independent variables were statistically significant at a 5% significance level: Sector, 
Tobin‟s Q and Origin of Control. It is worth mentioning that Growth Opportunity, which had a 
marginal significance (0.1339), once more presented a negative angular coefficient.  
Finally, the total disclosure model is also statistically significant and has an explanatory power 
of around 21,91% (R-square) and 17,94% (Adjusted R-square). Once more, heteroscedasticity was 
detected and corrected by the White covariance matrix.  
In this model, three variables were statistically significant at a 5% significance level: Sector, 
Tobin‟s Q and Origin of Control. Profitability is also significant, but at a 10% significance level.  
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Table 9 illustrates the total disclosure model.  
 
Table 9 
 
Panel Data – Total Disclosure (DIS_TOTAL) 
 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t statistics Prob.   
SIZE 0.012712 0.034236 0.371303 0.7108 
SECTOR 0.120333 0.028184 4.269559 0.0000 
ORIG_CONT 0.257698 0.070624 3.648890 0.0003 
TOBIN 0.030317 0.008931 3.394400 0.0008 
PROFIT 0.012272 0.006752 1.817636 0.0705 
LEV 0.012197 0.009112 1.338459 0.1822 
GOV -0.009946 0.022082 -0.450404 0.6529 
ISSUE -0.022517 0.030239 -0.744653 0.4573 
GROW -0.013481 0.009622 -1.401112 0.1626 
CONC_CONT 0.001370 0.021526 0.063649 0.9493 
AUD 0.016402 0.021959 0.746947 0.4559 
C 0.109576 0.472926 0.231699 0.8170 
R-square 0.219164 Adj. R-square 0.179399  
F Statistics  5.511503 Prob. (F) 0.000000  
Jarque-Bera  2.629376 Prob. (JB) 0.268558  
Durbin-Watson 2.289731    
Note. *White cross-section standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected). 
 
Based on the results, presented in Tables 7, 8 and 9, it is possible to summarize this study‟s 
main findings. At the same time, it is also possible to compare the main findings with what was 
expected from the hypotheses, as extracted from existing literature. Table 10 presents a summary of 
the determinants of voluntary disclosure.  
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Table 10 
 
Determinants of Voluntary Disclosure - Summary of Findings 
 
Variables 
Expected 
Signal 
Economic  
Disclosure 
Social - Environmental 
Disclosure 
Total 
Disclosure 
Observed 
Signal 
Sig Observed 
Signal 
Sig Observed 
Signal 
Sig 
SIZE (+) (+) No (+) No (+) No 
SECTOR (+) (+) Yes* (+) Yes* (+) Yes* 
TOBIN (+) (+) No (+) Yes* (+) Yes* 
ORIG_CONT (+) (+) Yes* (+) Yes* (+) Yes* 
PROFIT (+) (+) Yes* (+) No (+) Yes** 
LEV (+) (+) Yes* (+) No (+) No 
GOV (+) (+) No (-) No (-) No 
ISSUE (+) (-) No (-) No (-) No 
GROW (+) (-) No (-) No (-) No 
CONC_CONT (+) (+) No (-) No (+) No 
AUD (+) (+) Yes** (+) No (+) No 
INTER (+) Excluded from the Models due to multicollinearity 
Note. *Significance level of 5% ; **Significance level of 10%. 
 
 
Conclusions  
 
 
This paper used Discretionary-based Disclosure (Verrecchia, 2001) as the underpinning theory 
and aimed to identify the factors that explain the level of voluntary disclosure of Brazilian listed 
companies. For these, a panel data approach was used, where the level of voluntary disclosure 
(economic, socio-environmental and total) was explained by 12 independent variables, which were the 
study‟s hypotheses. Main findings were:  
. Sector and Origin of Control are statistically significant in all three models of disclosure; 
. Profitability is statistically significant in the economic model and in the total model;  
. Tobin‟s Q is statistically significant in the social and environment model and in the total disclosure 
model;  
. Leverage and Auditing are statistically significant only in the economic model;  
. Size, Corporate Governance, Growth Opportunity are not statistically significant in any of the 
models of disclosure;  
. Observed signals of angular coefficient are as expected from the existing literature, except for 
growth opportunity that presented a negative relation with voluntary disclosure. 
. Corporate Governance, Concentration of Control and Stock Issuing also presented different signals.  
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However, because they are binary variables and were not statistically significant, further 
interpretation is not possible.  
Interpretations of these findings indicate that ANEEL, which is the regulating entity of the 
electric sector, does influence the level of corporate voluntary disclosure. Apparently, this seems to be 
unique to the Brazilian Market, as the existing literature has not mentioned anything on this matter 
regarding other countries.  
At the same time, it is worthwhile mentioning the fact that companies controlled by the state 
have, on average, better disclosure practices than companies with private control. That also seems to 
be unique to the Brazilian Market, where the State still controls some corporations, especially in the 
Public Utilities sector. Surprisingly enough, findings demonstrate that these companies are more 
transparent than others. However, theoretical interpretation of that result is not found in the existing 
literature, as prior studies have not tested this hypothesis.  
Finally, the fact that profitability and Tobin‟s Q were significant in explaining voluntary 
disclosure practices corroborate Discretionary-based Disclosure as findings have shown that “good” 
quality Brazilian companies disclose more information. Apparently they do that in order to 
differentiate themselves and avoid the risk of being evaluated by the market as a “lemon”.  
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